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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade or so, the role of export subsidies has attracted re- 
newed interest in the current policy debate and in the literature on 
strategic trade policy. While the theoretical literature is very stimu- 
lating, little is known about and scarce attention is paid to the facts 
about export subsidization. Simplifying, in most theoretical models 
governments grant production subsidies to domestic firms of an in- 
dustry exporting to one specific market. In practice, several official 
agencies rn?y he invnlved in providing export credits and export in- 
surance subsidies to many domestic sectors exporting to a wide range 
of export destinations. In spite of the work by Abraham (1990), Abra- 
ham et al. (1992), Ford and Suyker (1990), Jepma (1991), and the EC 
(1990), there is only partial information about the size of the subsi- 
dies involved and their sectoral and regional break-up. As a conse- 
quence, the subsidy structure resulting from a policy of export pro- 
motion remains unclear. 
Moreover, small countries which are unable to improve domestic 
welfare by means of trade policy measures, usually see export subsi- 
dies as a means of maintaining the position of exporting firms in im- 
portant export markets. This view is consistent with the Belgian ap- 
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proach to export subsidization. Also, export subsidization is often part 
of a wider external policy towards third countries. Export subsidies 
are combined with and incorporated in development assistance schemes 
to cement a political and economic presence in befriended third world 
countries. 
A final issue concerns the regulatory framework of export subsi- 
dies. The existing literature usually ignores international agreements 
on export subsidization. i t  is not considered whether actual export sub- 
sidization breaches existing regulations. Nor is there an assessment 
of the extent to which these regulations restrict subsidization by na- 
tional governments and affect producers and consumers of the subsi- 
dized products. As a consequence, the type of global evaluation of the 
sectoral and country-by-country effects of trade policy, which is com- 
mon in the tariff literature, is lacking. 
This paper integrates these various aspects in an analysis of Bel- 
gian export insurance subsidization. The normative aspects of such a 
trade policy, being well discussed in the theoretical literature (Brand- 
er and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Helpman and 
Krugman (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1989)), are not the core is- 
sue of this analysis. Instead, the model focuses on market presence 
and performance of domestic exporters. Based on sectoral and re- 
gional export insurance subsidy rates, the impact of a unilateral adop- 
tion of the GATT-Subsidy-Code by the Belgian official export insur- 
ance agency is analyzed. This exercise allows to infer how non-com- 
pliance to the GATT-Code has affected Belgian government expen- 
ditures as well as the position of producers and importers of Belgian 
exports. It is shown that the Belgian export insurance system targets 
subsidies to a limited number of carefully chosen industries and re- 
gions. Although subsidies involved are not huge, they follow the pref- 
erential regional pattern of development aid provided by the Belgian 
government. 
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section I motivates our 
choice of export insurance. We present data on export insurance sub- 
sidies and argue that this type of subsidization displays a sectoral as 
well as a regional bias. In section 11, we develop a theoretical model 
of Belgian export insurance subsidization. In doing so, we carefully 
specify the institutional and regulatory aspects of export insurance 
subsidization. The model is used to derive the theoretical effects of 
an implementation of the GATT-Subsidy-Code on Belgian export in- 
surance in section 111. Section IV provides the empirical counterpart 
of this theoretical exercise. The concluding section relates our results 
to the importance of vested interests and ends with some additional 
comments. 
11. FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT EXPORT INSURANCE 
SUBSIDIZATION 
In many OECD-countries, the government is invoived in organizing 
export insurance on risky exports at favorable conditions when com- 
pared to private insurers. The Belgian official export insurance agen- 
cy is the Nationale Delcredere Dienst (NDD). It insures Belgian ex- 
ports to non-EC destinations for virtually the full value of the insured 
export contracts. For this insurance, the NDD receives a premium in- 
come. In case of non-payment by the importer, the NDD compen- 
sates the exporters and tries to claim the payment from the importer 
afterwards. Only 8 % of total Belgian exports to non-EC countries is 
insured by the NDD. 
Official export insurance is explicitly regulated in the GATT-Sub- 
sidy-Code. This code rules out long-term losses suffered by official ex- 
port insurance agencies. This means that the charged premiums should 
be sufficient to cover expected claims over a significantly long period 
of time. In spite of this international agreement, EC official agencies 
pr~vided a significant amount of subsidies during the 1980s (Abra- 
ham (1990) and Abraham, Couwenberg and Dewit (1992)). Table 1 
presents aggregated subsidy estimates for France, the UK, Belgium 
and Germany. Those estimates are obtained using the GATT-defini- 
tion, that is, subsidies are the difference between claims and premi- 
um income. 
TABLE 1 
Export insurance in  France, the UK, Belgiunz and Gerlnaily (1982-1987") 
Subsidies" as a 7; of Subsidies as a % of insured 
eligible export contracts 
FRANCE 0.50 2.99 
UK 0.69 4.18 
BELGIUM 0.73 3.60 
GERMANY 0.20 3.70 
'' Estimates for the UK and Germany refer to the period 1983-1987. 
h Subsidies are estimated as the difference between accumulated claims and premiums. 
Sollrce: Abraham e t  al. (1991), p. 9. 
From Table 1, we conclude that all four countries subsidized coun- 
tries through their export insurance schemes. Expressed as a percent- 
age share of eligible exports, subsidies seem to be insignificant (rang- 
ing between 0.20 % and 0.73 %). Still, there are no longer negligible 
when related to insured amounts, reaching values between 2.99 % and 
4.18 %. Hence, exporting firms insuring their riskier contracts are sub- 
sidized. 
In addition, subsidies are targeted to specific sectors and markets. 
Table 2 illustrates this point for the Belgian export insurance subsi- 
dies provided by the official export insurance agency, the Nationale 
Delcredere Dienst (NDD). First, sectoral subsidization rates show that 
the bulk of the subsidies flow to a limited number of industries, of 
which the Metal Articles sector and Mechanical Engineering are the 
main beneficiaries. Second, export insurance subsidies show a clear 
regional pattern. The Belgian subsidization policy systematically fa- 
vors exports to Africa and Eastern Europe, while leaving insurance 
activities w.r.t. non-EC Western European exports in a break-even po- 
sition. 
The targeting of subsidies is not a typically Belgian phenomenon. 
On the contrary, Melitz and Messerlin (1987) provide evidence that 
targeting is at least as strongly present in the French and English sub- 
sidization policy. What is more, the different national agencies have 
been giving large subsidies to the same eectcrs. 
111. THE MODEL 
In this section, we model the effects of the export insurance subsidies 
granted by the Belgian official export agency. First, we develop a styl- 
ized theoretical model for Belgian export insurance. Subsequently, we 
analyze the impact of an increase in insurance premium rates which 
could be the result of an enforcement of the GATT-Subsidy-Code on 
Belgian export insurance. 
A. Assumptions and structure of the model 
We concentrate on the manufacturing industry consisting of a set of 
monopolistically competitive sectors. Each sector generates a fixed but 
large number of varieties of their respective basic products, implying 
that sectoral profits do not necessarily shrink to zero'. Production in 
each industry is distributed across countries of which the domestic 
country is one (Belgium in our empirical application). Consumers are 
located in different countries but have identical tastes. 
Firms of the domestic country are symmetric. Symmetly here re- 
fers to the fact that domestic firms have the same cost structure, are 
exposed to the same extent to the risk of non-payment, and behave 
identically under uncertainty. Price discrimination across markets is 
feasible. Moreover, firms consider the risk of non-payment in differ- 
ent markets as unrelated. Technically speaking, the distributions of 
risk in different markets are independent. These assumptions guar- 
antee market segmentation. This allows us to treat each market sep- 
arately and to focus exclusively on the impact of different insurance 
costs across destinations. As Belgian official export insurance is pri- 
marily directed towards less developed countries and Eastern Eu- 
rope, the assumption of market segmentation appears acceptabie. 
To cover the risk of non-payment by foreign buyers, domestic firms 
can apply for official export insurance. The sequence of decisions can 
be described as a two-stage game. In a first stage, the official insur- 
ance agency decides on the premiums charged on contracts to the var- 
ious export destinations and on the percentage of the contract it wants 
to insure. This stage is treated as exogenous in this model2. In a sec- 
ond stage, the firm determines its optimal output on the one hand, 
and the optimal share of risky exports to be insured on the other hand. 
B. Specification of the demand structure 
Demand for a particular variety of a specific good is derived from a 
two-stage optimization problem familiar from the work by Helpman 
and Krugman ((1985), (1989)). Let eij be expenditure in market j al- 
located to products of sector i. This expenditure level is derived from 
a global consumer utility maximization problem for a representative 
consumer in market j and is not considered here. 
Suppose there are n firms in industry i, selling in market j. De- 
mand in market j for a variety of industly i, xii, is found by maximizing 
the CES (sub)utility function Uj: 
INDUSTRY b N4CE TOTAL AFRICA AMERICA ASIA UiESTERb! EASTERN OTHER 1 " 
EUROPE EUROPE COCrNTRIESb I 
(EC excluded) 
221-223 Iron and Steel 0.57 1.58 0.77 0.29 -0.03 0.99 -0.05 
224 Non-ferrous Metals 0.22 0.74 0.31 0.10 -0.02 0.44 -0.03 
Building Materials 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.00 
Glass 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 
Chemical Industry 0.40 1.72 0.63 0.21 -0.02 0.55 -0.03 
Metal Articles 3.15 5.74 5.23 1 .86 -0.1 1 1.88 -0.53 
.Mechanical Eneineering 1.26 3.59 l .59 0.65 -0.10 2.34 
33-34 Electrical Engineering 0.59 1.72 0.76 0.25 -0.05 1.39 
35-36 Transport 0.15 0.63 0.16 0.03 -0.02 1.90 
Instrument Engineering 0.27 0.82 0.39 0.12 -0.02 0.48 -0.05 
'411-423 Food 0.23 0.78 0.28 0.10 -0.02 0.66 -0.03 
424-428 Beverages 0.44 1.17 0 60 0.23 -0.02 0.80 -0.02 
429 Tobacco 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
43 Textiles 0.48 1.61 0.61 0.22 -0.02 1 10 
44 Leather 0.30 1.01 0.50 0.15 -0.01 0.63 
45 1-452 Footwear 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
453-454 Wearing Apparel 0.19 0.64 0.25 0.09 -0.01 0.39 
I467 Furniture 0.26 0.79 0.39 0.13 -0.01 0.47 -0.02 
473-474 Printing and Publishing 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 
Other manufacturing 0.01 0.04 0 02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
industries 
TOTAL 0.38 1.53 0.50 0.15 -0.03 0.90 
2 
a Subsidization rates are estimzted as the difference between claims and premiums (1983-l988), expressed as a % share of non-EC Belgian exports. 
b Including Australia, New Zealand and the Western Pacific islands. 8 
So~i i .ce:  NDD (1983-1988). Annual Reports + own calculations 
for a given expenditure level eij. Dropping the industry subscript, we 
obtain demand for a representative variety in market j: 
or, 
with pj the market-specific price of a representative variety and P, a 
sectoral price index of all varieties consumed in market j. If the home 
country is relatively small (as in the Belgian case), its national indus- 
try has no effect on the aggregate sectoral price level in market j. 
Therefore, it follows from (2b) that the perceived price elasticity of 
demand for a Belgian variety is equal to the constant elasticity of sub- 
stitution in demand, o. 
C. Decision behavior of the firm with insurance 
As mentioned earlier, only a minor part of total exports is insured. 
Firms thus differentiate between export contracts with "safe" and 
"risky" customers. Transactions with foreign buyers are considered 
risky if the firm is not certain to receive (full) payment for the deiiv- 
ered goods. Both groups of buyers are present in all export markets. 
For contracts with risky buyers, the firm considers whether to take in- 
surance. No insurance is needed for export contracts with safe con- 
sumers. 
l .  T h e  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  w i t h  
i n s u r a n c e  
The profit maximizing objective is formulated in the same way as the 
hedging problem (Ethier (1973), Holthausen (1979), Matz and Pa- 
roush (1979) and Feder et al. (1980)). -We introduce a stochastic vari- 
able E , ,  standing for the share of the contract that will be paid. The 
subscript j indicates that this variable is specific for market j. e, is uni- 
formly distributed over the interval [a,,b,], with O<a,<b,<l, and the 
boundaries of the interval are market dependent3 So, without insul- 
ance, profits amount to (Z,P:xl,-C,), where X,' is the firm's risky export 
to market j, p,' is the corresponding price and C, is the cost of pro- 
duction. The production process is characterized by increasing re- 
turns to scale, or C=a+cxjr (and a, c are  constant^)^. 
Firms can apply for export insurance provided by the government 
agency. The variable yj represents the share of risky contracts that is 
insured5. The insurance contract commits the agency to compensate 
the firm's losses incurred on the export contract, i.e., the claimed part 
(l-yj). In return, the firm pays an insurance premium, which differs 
by region of export destination. So, depending on the category to 
which the country of destination is assigned, a different premium rate 
prevails. We assume that the charged premium rate (rj, i.e., the pre- 
mium rate per currency unit of risky exports) is fixed and therefore 
independent of the actually insured share of the risky export con- 
tract. Hence, the risky profit (pjr) function with insurance is equal to: 
We interpret (l-Cj-r,) as the net-claim rate on the insurance compa- 
ny, or the claim rate (l-i,) minus the charged premium rate (r,). 
Given a certain degree of profit variability, the firm maximizes ex- 
pected profit generated by the risky exports. We adopt the following 
mean-variance expression for the expected iltility fl-~nction ~f the firm: 
EV: and Eft; respectively represent expected certainty-equivalent 
profits and expected profits, and h stands for the firm's degree of risk 
aversion. 
2 .  O p t i m a l  i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e  by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
f i r m  
Maximizing expected certainty-equivalent profits w.r.t. y, results in: 
We concentrate on the sign of (1- E,-rj) in expression (5) which deter- 
mines whether the firm takes full, partial or no insurance at all. The 
enforcement of the GATT-Code implies an increase in the premium 
rate as to achieve equality with the claim rate (and thus I-&, = r j )  From 
(5) it is seen that when the official export insurance agency is in a 
break-even position (if 1- &,=rj) or when it is subsidizing exports (if 
1- E,> rj), the optimum for the firm is to take full insurance 6. For the 
policy experiment considered in this paper, we can therefore concen- 
trate on the case of full insurance. 
3 .  P r i c e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w i t h  i n s u r a n c e  
To obtain the optimal pricing decision for risky contracts with full in- 
surance, we maximize expected certainty-equivalent profits of the firm, 
E'v'j', w.r. t. X;. This yields: 
An increase in the insurance cost causes the price of insured (i.e., 
risky) exports to go up. 
D. Decisions of the firm for contracts without risk 
Now we turn to the firm's optimal decision w.r.t. safe contracts. Un- 
certainty disappears (Ej=l) and insurance is not necessary (yj=O). 
Hence, the firm's profit function (3) for safe contracts is reduced to 
pjs= (p:-c)xj'. The insurance cost is not relevant for the price decision 
o 
of safe contracts and expression (6a) simplifies to p:=---c. 
o- l 
IV. EFFECTS O F  ENFORCING THE GATT-SUBSIDY-CODE 
Now suppose that the GATT-Subsidy-Code is implemented and that 
the official insurance company is forced to raise the insurance pre- 
mium rate. First, we derive the elasticity of the price of risky exports 
w.r.t. a one percentage point increase in the premium rate, given by: 
Next, we consider the effects on total sectoral exports to market j by 
home firms. In the sector considered, there are njd identical domestic 
firms, selling xf to risky buyers and xi" to safe buyers in market j. De- 
fining ~,=njd(x;+xj \ )=~f  +X: as total domestic exports to market j, 
we derive from (2b) and (7) that Xj declines when the premium rate 
increases: 
d l n  Xi 
- 
0 
-nr -- 
L4 ' drj l - r j  
where a; represents the share of risky contracts in total exports. Since 
only risky exports are affected by the increase in price (i.e., a; % share 
of total contracts) and the perceived elasticity of demand is larger than 
one (o  > l), the output effect dominates the price effect. Hence, an 
increase in the premium rate will lower sales of domestic exporting 
firms in market j: 
This drop in sales is more outspoken if the share of risky exports in 
total contracts and the perceived price elasticity of demand are high. 
Given that sales will decline as a result of an increase in the pre- 
mium rate, profits will decrease as well. Since the premium rate only 
affects risky profits, expression (3) allows us to derive the effect on 
total industry profits of domestic firms exporting to market j as: 
Fically, we define the expected subsidization cost for the government 
(ESj), obtained as the subsidy per insured currency unit multiplied by 
insured amounts: 
Ihowing from ( 5 )  and (6a) that y, and p,' depend on r,, we take the 
total deriva~ive of expresaiorl (11) w.r.i. I, and we sbtain: 
Given that the price elasticity of demand is larger than one, a premi- 
um increase will induce a fall in the subsidization cost for the govern- 
ment, whichwill be large as the rate of subsidization and the price elas- 
ticity of demand are sufficiently high. 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS O F  BELGIAN 
EXPORT lNSURANCE SUBSIDIZATION 
In this section, we implement the model to analyze the effects of uni- 
lateral compliance of the GATT-Subsidy-Code by the Belgian official 
export insurance agency, NDD. In each sector and market, we raise 
the premium rate rj to the level that guarantees equality between pre- 
mium income and expected claims. As a measure for subsidization, 
we used the difference between accumulated claims and premiums for 
the period 1983-'88, as represented by Table 2. All variables were com- 
puted using data provided by the NDD. 
The empirical implementation of the model requires estimates of 
the elasticity of si~bstitution and the share of risky contracts ir, ex- 
ports. Table 3 reflects values for both variables. As a proxy for o, sec- 
toral price elasticities of import demand as estimated by Deardorff 
and Stern ((1990), Table 3.2) are used. This choice is justified by two 
features of our model. First, o measures the elasticity of substitution 
between (any group of) varieties of the same industry product and 
hence also captures the substitution between imported and home 
products. 
Mnresver, individual expcrtin* b firms perceive o as thc price clas- 
ticity for their products on third markets. The highest values for o are 
noted in the Wearing Apparel sector, Metal Articles and Transport, 
with estimates higher than three. 
In order to assess the riskiness of the selected industries, the sec- 
ond part of Table 3 expresses risky contracts as a percentage share of 
industry exports. Although in most industries risky exports do not ex- 
ceed 10 % of total exports, they are vital to the Metal Articles sector, 
covering 65 % of all contracts. When risky contracts are regionally dis- 
aggregated, more or less the same risk categorization is revealed. 
Tables 4 and 5 summarize our results. Table 4 provides a sectoral 
break-up of the reductions in government expenditures on the one 
hand, and presents sectoral changes in production and sales both for 
insured exporters and the industry as a whole on the other hand. Fi- 
nally, Table 5 measures the changes in Belgian export sales disaggre- 
gated by region of destination. 
NACE INDUSTRY oa Risky contractsb(??) / P 
TOTAL AFRICA NORTH & ASIA EASTERN EUROPE 
224 Kon-ferrous Metals 1.38 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 
24 1-246 Building Materials 2.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
247 Glass 1.60 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
25 Chemical Industry 2.53 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.08 
3 1 Metal Articles 3.59 0.65 0.68 0.58 0.69 0.27 
32 Mechanical Engineering 1.02 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.35 0.37 
33-34 Electrical Engineering 1 .OO 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.20 0.21 
35-36 Transport 3.28 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.41 
3 7 Instrument Engineering 1.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.1 1 
411-423 Food 1.13 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.07 
424-428 Beverages 1.64 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.1 1 
429 Tobacco 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
43 Textiles 1.14 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.15 
44 Leather 1.58 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.10 
45 1-452 Footwear 2.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
453-454 Wearing Apparel 3.92 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 
467 Furniture 3.00 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.07 
473-474 Printing and Publishing 2.85 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 
49 Other manufacturing 2.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
industries 
a LT is the sectoral price elasticity of import demand as estimated by Deardorff and Stern (1990). 
b Since subsidization implies that risky contracts are fully insured, insured contracts have been used as a proxy for risky contracts. 
Soii/.ci.: NDD ( 1  983-1988). Annual Reports + own calc~~lations. 
% 
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SOUTH AMERICA 
221-223 Iron and Steel 1.42 0.1 1 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.16 
?2 8 
P 
NACE INDUSTRY GOVERNMENT TOTAL INDUSTRY INSURED EXPORTERS 
Cost savings Profit effect Output Sales Output Sales 
effect effect effect effect 
millions as a % share millions as a % share as a % share as a % share 
of ECU of exports of ECU of exports of exports of exports 
221-223 Iron and Steel -35.6 -0.57 -35.6 -0.57 -0.81 -0.24 
. 
-7.25 -2.14 
224 Non-ferrous Metals -5.4 -0.22 -5.4 -0.22 -0.31 -0.08 -7.1 1 -1.96 
24 1-246 Building Materials -0.0 -0.03 -0.0 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -9.28 -4.64 
247 Glass -0.4 -0.05 -0.4 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -7.54 -2.83 
2 5 Chemical Industry -39.3 -0.40 -39.0 -0.40 -1.01 -0.61 -13.02 -7.87 
3 1 Metal Articles -57.5 -3.41 -53.4 -3.41 -11.39 -8.22 -17.50 -12.62 
32 Mechanical Engineering -101.1 -1.26 -101.1 -1.26 -1.30 -0.03 -5.32 -0.10 
33-34 Electrical Engineering -23.5 -0.59 -23.5 -0.59 -0.60 -0.00 -4.66 -0.00 
35-36 Transport -12.3 -0.15 -12.2 -0.15 -0.48 -0.34 -12.65 
3 7 Instrument Engineering -2.1 -0.27 -2.1 -0.27 -0.29 -0.02 -5.38 -0.40 
411-423 Food -9.8 -0.23 -9.8 -0.23 -0.27 -0.03 -5.42 -0.62 
424-428 Beverages -0.3 -0.44 -0.3 -0.44 -0.73 -0.28 -8.45 -3.30 
429 Tobacco -0.0 -0.01 -0.0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -6.87 -0.79 
43 Textiles -19.6 -0.48 -19.6 -0.48 -0.55 -0.07 -5.76 -0.71 
44 Leather -0.6 -0.30 -0.6 -0.30 -0.48 -0.18 -7.78 -2.86 
45 1-452 Footwear -0.0 -0.00 -0.0 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -15.40 -8.96 
453-454 Wearing Apparel -0.6 -0.19 -0.6 -0.19 -0.76 -0.56 -21.83 -16.26 
467 Furniture -1.0 -0.26 -1.0 -0.26 -0.79 -0.53 -14.53 -9.68 
473-474 Printing and Publishing -0.2 -0.07 -0.2 -0.07 -0.21 -0.13 -13.30 -8.63 
49 Other manufacturing -2.4 -0.01 -2.4 -0.0 1 -0.02 -0.01 -9.39 -4.83 
industries 
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TOTAL -315.1 -0.39 -3 10.2 -0.39 -0.02 -0.01 -9.39 -4.83 1 
a The output effect reflects the impact on real production, while the sales effect is the combination of price and output effects. 
2. 
1 NACE INDUSTRY AFRICA AMERICA ASIA EASTERN EUROPE 
Iron and Steel 
Non-ferrous Metals 
Building Materials 
Glass 
Chemical Industry 
Metal Articles 
Mechanical Engineering 
Electrical Engineering 
Transport 
Instrument Engineering 
Food 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Leather 
Footwear 
Wearing Apparel 
Furniture 
Printing and Publishing 
Other manufacturinrr industries 
a Sales effects refer to the industry as a whole 
Six interesting findings emerge from our policy experiment: 
1. The subsidy policy is costly for the government. As indicated by the 
first column of Table 4, compliance with GATT-rules cuts the Bel- 
gian budget deficit by a total of 315 millions of ECU. In absolute 
amounts, the transfers to Iron and Steel, Chemicals, Metal Arti- 
cles, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering would decline most 
and exceed 23 millions of ECU in each of those industries. De- 
pending on the sector involved, the Belgian government would save 
on average 0.38 ECU on every hundred ECU exported. These fig- 
ures are similar to the subsidy rates found in Table 2 but not nec- 
essarily equal as they capture both a subsidy removal on existing 
contracts and the decline in risky Belgian exports as a result of the 
higher premium rates (for instance, the difference for the Metal 
Articles industry). 
2. The subsidy policy benefits the insured firms. In the third and fourth 
column of Table 4, we see that an elimination of subsidies would 
lower profits of insured exporting firms by about the same magni- 
tude as it would reduce government expenditures. The largest pro- 
fit losses are concentrated in the sectors that receive most of the 
NDD's export insurance subsidies (i.e., Chemicals, Metal Arti- 
cles, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering). We conclude that in 
virt~ial!y a11 industrjeq prnfit lnssrs are slightly insiifficiently qe- 
vere to compensate the reduction in government expenditure. This 
is inherent to any form of trade intervention for small open econ- 
omies, where subsidies only induce a deadweight loss in the form 
of increased exports, implying a net-welfare loss for the subsidiz- 
ing economy as a whole 
Yet, the provided subsidies help to preserve the position of domes- 
tic exporters in foreign markets. The output adjustments in the one 
but last column of Table 4 support this argument by illustrating the 
disruptive effects for insured exporters of a subsidy removal. In all sec- 
tors, output of insured exporting firms would decline by more than 5 
%. In Chemicals, Metal Articles, Transport Equipment, Footwear, 
Wearing Apparel, Furniture, and Printing and Publishing, the output 
concentration exceeds 10 %. It is possible that output changes of this 
magnitude would entail major employment adjustments in exporting 
firms. It should be stressed that this is only true if the previously pro- 
vided export insurance subsidies are not substituted by an increase in 
domestic tied aid programs to these markets. If this substitution oc- 
curs, the effect on domestic exports will be less severe and so will the 
need for employment adjustments. 
The impact on sales of insured exporters (last column of Table 4) 
is less pronounced because exporting firms charge higher prices after 
the subsidy removal, hereby compensating part of their declining mar- 
ket share. Nevertheless, insured exporters of the sectors indicated 
above experience a reduction in sales of 7.8 % or more. 
3. In almost all sectors the beneficiaries of export insurance subsi- 
dies are a limited well-defined set of exporting firms with risky ex- 
port contracts. This is seen by comparing the total industry output 
and sales effects in columns five and six of Table 4 with the impact 
of insured exporters only. Adjustments for the whole industry are 
obtained by weighing the effects for insured exporters by the share 
of insured contracts in total industry export contracts. In all but one 
sectors the industry output and sales adjustments amount to less 
than one and a half percent. The notable exception is the Metal 
Articles industry which would experience a 11.39 % output and a 
8.22 % sales reduction in the event of an implementation of inter- 
national agreements on Belgian export insurance. This is not sur- 
prising since this sector was characterized earlier as the main re- 
cipient of export insurance subsidies with almost two thirds of its 
eai;Grt coiltracts officially insiircd. 
4. Sectoral patterns are maintained in the regional disaggregation of 
the total industry sales effects presented in Table 5. Industries that 
benefit from subsidization in one market generally do so in other 
markets as well. Yet, exports to Africa and Eastern Europe would 
suffer more from compliance with international regulations than 
Belgian sales in Asia and the American continent. Note that ex- 
ports to non-EC Western European countries are not considered 
in Table 5.  As seen in Table 2, insurance premium rates on those 
exports suffice to cover claims so that the GATT-Subsidy-Code is 
respected. To the extent that premium income from these con- 
tracts is used to cross-subsidize exports to other markets, insured 
companies exporting to non-EC Western European countries may 
even advocate an enforcement of GATT-rules. 
5. Specific importers of Belgian products would be hurt by an export 
insurance subsidy removal in Belgium. The sales effects in Table 4 
and 5 measure how much consumers are paying more to buy Bel- 
gian exports. Compliance with GATT will face importers with doubt- 
ful credit-ratings with rapidly rising prices for Belgian products as 
Belgian exporters pass through steeply increasing premium rates. 
Only part of these price increases can be offset by switching to sub- 
stitutes produced by other than Belgian firms. High-risk import- 
ers in Africa and North and South America buying Metal Prod- 
ucts and certain other Belgian products appear particularly vul- 
nerable. 
6. Belgian export insurance subsidization reinforces the outspoken 
regional targeting in official development aid. We argued earlier 
that export insurance schemes often are contained in the govern- 
ment's policy on official development assistance (ODA). Export 
insurance subsidies are then viewed as a form of ODA. Because 
exporters of each variety of manufactures have some market pow- 
er in the importing country, a subsidy induced premium decrease 
will lower the import prices of the varieties involved (see expres- 
sion (7)) and expand sales (see expression (9)). This type of ODA 
benefits consumers in developing countries only to the extent that 
they purchase the subsidized varieties. Yet, unlike tied aid, it af- 
fects sales only through the market demand prevailing in the im- 
porting country. Since they are usually designed for regions clas- 
sified in the highest default of payment risk categories, insured ex- 
porters to high-risk regions are likely to experience significant gains 
in sales by thcsc 3CA-programs. 
TABLE 6 
A regional clisaggregation of' grant elements implied 
in Belgian state-to-state credits 
U (1 964-1 988) 
Grants [in rnill~olls of BEF Grant5 as a % s l~are  of 
and in shares) state-to-state credits 
Total 41887 76.09 
of M ~ I ~ C I Z  (% S I I O I P S ) :  
Africa 29.41 78.97 
Aaia 55.09 76.90 
Central and South America 4.24 69.74 
Western Europe 0.07 37.14 
Eaatern Europe 11.18 68.75 
So~irce: Abraham (1990), p. 68. 
Table 6 presents regional figures on the grant elements embodied 
in state-to-state credits, which is a form of official development aid. 
As can be seen from the first column, the regional division of grants 
(1964-1988) is significantly biased in favor of Asian and African coun- 
tries. More specifically, grants to these countries almost cover 85 % 
of total grants. It has been shown that precisely these regions are also 
the main beneficiaries of export insurance subsidies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper estimated the sectoral and regional impact of Belgian of- 
ficial export insurance subsidies. To do so, we developed a partial equi- 
librium, multi-sector and multi-region model with product differen- 
tiation and market segmentation. The model pays detailed attention 
to the institutional and regulatoly framework of export insurance. On 
each market, exporting firms determine prices and output and de- 
cide on the optimal insurance coverage on their risky contracts. The 
official insurance agency provides subsidies in the form of premia be- 
low expected claim levels. Such subsidies are not allowed under the 
GATT-Subsidy-Code. 
Official export insurance subsidization displays some key features 
of the use of export subsidies. By not complying to GATT-rules, the 
Belgian official agency is involved in selectively subsidizing insured 
firms in specific industries, exporting to specific destinations. This pol- 
icy is costly i s  budgztary terzs,  but significantly benefits profits, prs-  
duction and sales levels of the insured exporters as well as the import- 
ers of the insured Belgian export goods. The subsidy policy is how- 
ever not strategic in the sense that it achieves any welfare gains. On 
the contrary, congruent to the theoretical literature on trade policy 
for small open economies, Belgian export insurance subsidization en- 
genders a small welfare loss for the economy, due to the deadweight 
loss effect of the envisaged policy. 
Our findings further suggest that reverting targeted subsidy poli- 
cies may not be an easy task. In contrast to more general subsidiza- 
tion schemes, export insurance subsidies matter a lot for the selected 
few and therefore create vested interests. In the Belgian case, we 
would expect strong opposition by the Metal Articles industry sup- 
ported by the officially insured companies exporting Chemicals, Trans- 
port Equipment, Footwear, Wearing Apparel, to mention just a few. 
This coalition is likely to be joined by representatives from the im- 
porting countries. Since the government of the importing countries 
usually participate in some form in officially insured export transac- 
tions to Africa and Eastern Europe, a control of Belgian export in- 
surance subsidies would easily take on a wider political dimension. The 
fact that state-to-state official development assistance is marked by a 
similar regional pattern as export insurance subsidies, only reinforc- 
es the conclusion. For all of these regions, one should not expect a 
voluntary unilateral compliance with the GATT-Code by the Belgian 
official export insurance agency in spite of the budgetary savings in- 
volved. 
This leaves a multilateral enforcement in the framework of GATT, 
the EC or even the OECD as the way forward if subsidy control is the 
ultimate objective. The effects of compliance with the GATT-Subsi- 
dy-Code by all trading partners lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
but represents an important extension in the light of the strategic trade 
literature. Provided that the required data can be obtained, future 
work intends to address this issue. 
This paper can be improved on other counts. First, market segmen- 
tation is maintained, implying independent default of payment distri- 
butions across markets. Secondly, we ignore problems of adverse se- 
lection by assuming that the agency is capable of differentiating be- 
tween safe and risky export contracts. Thirdly, a full general equilib- 
rium analysis is lacking. Finally, the behavior of the official export in- 
surance agency was treated as exogenous. Interactions between the 
official agency and the firm taking insurance are therefore not con- 
sidered. 
NOTES 
1. The main purpose of this model is to determine how dramatic an export insurance sub- 
sidy ban is for each sector. If entry is considered, this effect is translated into a change in 
market shares of domestic exporting industries. If, like in our model, the number of va- 
rieties produced in each sector is fixed, a subsidy removal affects export profits of do- 
mestic firms. Although not perfectly equivalent, the relative order of magnitude should 
be the same in both scenarios. 
2. Endogenizing this stage would redirect the attention from the positive analysis of ex- 
port insurance subsidization to the normative question of optimal premium rating, which 
is an issue surpassing the scope of this paper. 
3. Alternatively, the stochastic variable could also be captured by a truncated normal dis- 
tribution on ]a,,b,[ with N (e,,~,'). 
4. Together with the assumption of independent default of payment distributions, the fact 
that the marginal cost of production, c, is constant, allows us to solve our problem for 
complete market segmentation, which makes consumer surplus in the domestic country 
irrelevant to our solution. 
5 .  We only consider one risk category of export contracts. Differentiating between various 
risk categories by assuming a regional distribution of default of payment distributions 
would introduce a problem of adverse selection into our model, disabling us from calcu- 
lating the expected sectoral effects of a non-subsidization regime. 
6. Even if 1 - E, > r,,  f, = 1, because 0 < yi 5 1. Still, this would not be the case if the 
insurance market would be incomplete due to information aspmmetries, such as prob- 
lems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Since the purpose of this paper lies not in 
the study of the effects of such asymmetries on export prices, a perfectly efficient export 
insurance market is assumed. 
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